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I INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to consider the implications of European monetary integration for
peripheral economies within Europe, with a particular focus on the experience of Spain. The
view represented in the European Commission's own research is summarised as follows:
As regards the regional distribution of the impact [of EMU], which is relevant to the
objective of longer-term convergence of economic performance, there are no a priori
grounds for predicting the pattern of relative gains and losses. There are risks and
opportunities of different types affecting both categories of regions. Policies are already
at work to reduce locational disadvantages of the least favoured and geographically
peripheral regions. However, the key to the catching-up process lies in obtaining
synergies between Community and national efforts to upgrade the least favoured
regional economies.   The fixing of clear policy objectives, such as for the single market
and EMU, are also highly relevant here for mobilizing such efforts   (Commission for the
European Communities, 1990, p12, emphasis added).
This paper will focus on the implications of EMU for the financial sector, and for its
influence on peripheral regions. In particular the consequences of deregulation and increased
competition will be considered: the currency unification and fiscal co-ordination features of
EMU will not be addressed directly.
The premise of the argument to be developed is that credit creation is relevant to
regional economic development. The process of credit creation is complex. It requires
consideration not only of the supply side, and the possibilities of credit-rationing, but also of
the demand-side, and firms’ and households’ preferred financial structure, with its implications
for firms' propensity to invest and consumers’ propensity to spend. Risk perception, is central
to both the supply and demand sides. Given that risk may be assessed differently for different
classes of borrowers in different regions, the resulting pattern of credit creation may in turn
determine the industrial structure of each region. Further, different patterns of perceived risk in
different regions can lead to a pattern of expenditure plans and portfolio selection which
discourages credit allocation to peripheral regions. (See Dow and Rodriguez Fuentes, 1997
for a fuller account of this argument and how it relates to other arguments in the regional
finance literature.) Thus, while banks have increasingly gained control over the volume of credit
creation, they may still choose to ration credit in aggregate, and to particular classes of
borrowers. The process of European monetary integration may thus set in train forces which
exacerbate the credit availability problems of peripheral regions.
Given the significance to this approach of the potential for differences among different
parties’ risk perception, it is important to consider the structure of decision-making, ie the
regional structure of the financial sector. We are thus concerned to examine the structure of the
financial sector in Europe, and how it is likely to be affected by the aspects of EMU on which
we are focussing here: increased competition, unified regulation, and a move to a unified
institutional structure. We then proceed to the main contribution of this paper, which lies in
assessing these arguments in relation to Spain.4
II EUROPEAN FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
There are at least two views as to the likely structure to emerge in the European financial
sector as a result of financial integration:
•  The first is that increasing competition will lead to higher efficiency and reduced
segmentation in financial markets. Therefore, higher financial efficiency may improve
long run growth expectations in less developed regions in Europe since they must have
been suffering some credit rationing in the past.
•  The second view is that increased competition can also lead to higher concentration in
the financial system, and this may not improve credit availability in some cases (due to
regional differences in liquidity preference, access to finance sources other than bank
credit, etc.), and may encourage excessive financial outflows from regional markets.
The European Commission (1990) research report supports the first view, suggesting
that peripheral regions will benefit from improved cost and availability of credit as a result of
the single European market:
With full monetary union local banks will loose(sic) [local] monopoly power assuming
that  borrowers will have direct access to foreign banks, either locally established or not,
after the opening of the domestic financial market. Besides this credit availability effect,
the borrowers in peripheral countries will also benefit from the level of interest rates
which very likely will stay below those prevailing in the region before monetary
unification. These two effects - availability and lower price - will represent a clear benefit
for the borrowers of lagging regions.
However, local banks may be disrupted because foreign banks will rapidly seize the best
segment of the market leaving the local banks with the less performing borrowers.
Besides, the new and open financial market will develop in a context of tighter financial
discipline and stricter rules for credit granting which may crowd out the (marginal)
borrowers of the lagging regions. The net effect is ambiguous. ...... Naturally, the
situation will disappear once the local bank[s] ha[ve] recovered and adapted to the new
conditions.
(Commission for the European Communities, 1990, p225)
This quotation involves several presumptions about the financial structure which is
likely to pertain in an integrated European financial system:
1. increased competition in which small local banks will initially be disadvantaged;
2. an eventual resumption of balance between large national and multi-national
banks and regenerated local banks;
the eventual consequences being:
3. increased efficiency resulting in lower interest rates in peripheral regions;
4. reduced credit rationing, but lesser availability for high-risk borrowers in
remoter regions.5
But this view is not borne out by the study of banking history, which suggests that the
competition which characterises the opening of new markets eventually reverts to
concentration. This was the experience for example of the Scottish and Canadian banking
systems (see Dow and Smithin, 1992, and Dow, 1990, respectively).
A review of the literature on Europe in the 1980s and 1990s by Bisignano (1992) also
suggests that concentration is the likely eventual outcome of European financial integration,
although he predicts that fragmentation will persist for some time. Gentle and Marshall (1992)
and Gentle (1993) identify a significant spatial element in the concentration in the financial
services sector in the UK in the 1980s, which is anticipated to continue with further integration
in the European financial sector.
The EC (1990) prediction of a competitive reassertion by small local banks draws
support from Branson’s predictions of the emergence in Europe of a two-tier banking
structure whereby local markets will still be served by local banks operating alongside large
multinational banks (a prediction shared by Goodhart, 1987). But what they seem to have in
mind is local in the sense of national, which would still be compatible with concentration away
from peripheral regions within nations. Further, the type of two-tier system they have in mind
has much in common with that traditionally identified in the US (as analysed for example by
Moore and Hill, 1982, Harrigan and McGregor, 1987 and Dow, 1987). Weisbrod (1991)
explicitly uses the US case to argue that concentration will not occur in Europe. Yet financial
liberalisation in the US has significantly increased the degree of concentration in banking,
eroding the importance of the second tier of banking. But the concentration has not been
spatial in the same way as the UK. Indeed, Santomero (1993) argues that the political and
cost pressures which have led head offices to disperse operations spatially may well operate
similarly in Europe. This could be to the advantage of peripheral regions in terms of
employment and output although not necessarily in terms of credit availability.
Overall, then, the prediction that local banks will eventually regain their competitive
position relative to the large national and multinational banks does not find much support from
past experience or the balance of the relevant literature.  But there is the suggestion of
advantage to these regions in terms of more favourable terms for financial services. Certainly,
ceteris paribus, increased competition and economies of scale in a multinational market would
be expected to increase efficiency (see Bisignano, 1992). But Eckbo (1991) argues that
efficiency gains will not necessarily be passed on, due to increased concentration in European
banking.
In addition, the experience of Britain as an already-integrated financial market suggests
that regional differentials may persist. McKillop and Hutchison (1990) identify two forms of
segmentation present in the British banking sector: institutional and market segmentation. The
first refers to the existence of local banks institutionally distinct from the national banks; the
second refers to national banks having regionally distinct markets. As far as Europe is
concerned the first would be the case anticipated by the EC, with the persistence of local
banks. The second would be the case of concentration in large multinational banks.
In both cases, segmentation creates the opportunity for different interest rates and/or6
charges. These latter are becoming an ever-more significant element in bank profits and may
be a means more appealing to the banks to differentiate between markets than interest rates as
such. In the case of institutional segmentation, small local banks have less ready access to
funds than large banks, as well as some local monopoly power in terms of credit availability,
both of which would explain higher interest rates in remote regions. The observation that this is
the case is consistent with the theoretical literature with respect to a two-tier regional banking
market in the US. In the case of market segmentation, Hutchison and McKillop identify the
higher costs to national institutions of operating in remote regions: costs of acquiring
information about borrowers in the region, transaction cost premiums for remote regions on
trading in extra-regional assets, and differential attitudes towards risk. Again, the outcome for
remote regions was identified to be higher interest and/or other charges. The implication for
Europe is that, even if a two-tier banking system emerges, institutional segmentation can be
expected to lead to higher charges in remote regions, just as would the alternative of a single-
tier system with market segmentation. If market segmentation can persist within a nation state
like Britain, then it is even more likely to persist in Europe. Montgomery’s (1991) analysis,
based on the experience within Italy, supports this view. Regional differences in interest rates
and/or bank charges are therefore likely to persist even within a financially integrated Europe. 
 
At the same time as the financial sector is undergoing spatial concentration, its overall
structure is also undergoing evolution. Banks have over the last decade faced increased
competition from non-banks, while the policy of financial liberalisation has progressively
broken down many of the regulatory distinctions between banks and non-banks. This process
has been termed market structural diffusion (see Gardener, 1988). Insofar as the large
multinational banks have developed competitive strategies more quickly and successfully than
small local banks in order to address the increased competition from non-banks, the tendency
towards concentration in banking will be reinforced. The influence of financial liberalisation in
Europe on credit creation in peripheral regions will thus be the outcome of two forces:
1. the spatial concentration of creators of credit.
2. the effects of non-bank competition on the preferences of banks with respect
to the volume and distribution of credit.
We examine these forces more closely in the evidence for the experience of the
financial sector in Spain in the 1980s and 1990s.
III THE SPANISH EXPERIENCE
The Spanish financial system has experienced a rapid and intense process of deregulation in
the eighties and nineties, leading to the current situation of strong competition which
characterises most European banking systems. Most of these financial changes have had much
to do with the membership of Spain to the EU (in year 1986), and with the advances
registered during the eighties and nineties in the construction of the financial counterpart of the
European single market: the Single European Financial Market.7
The current situation of the Spanish financial system clearly contrasts with that of the
sixties and seventies, which was characterised by the existence of virtually no competition
among banks, both from an internal (among Spanish banks) and external (between Spanish
and foreign institutions) point of view, and a close control both over interest rates and the
allocation of financial resources channelled by the financial institutions. All these features
started to be removed from the mid seventies, firstly by allowing banks to open more branches
all over the country in 1974, a possibility which was extended much later (in 1989) to the
savings banks. This explains the different trend followed by banks and savings banks in the
opening of branches from mid seventies (figure 1).






































































Source: Bank of Spain
Although foreign banks were allowed to operate in 1978, the “real” opening up of the
national banking market wouldn’t really come until the late eighties (with the progressive
adaptation of the Spanish financial regulation to that of the Second Banking Directive).
Therefore, it was not until the nineties that foreign European banks started to compete on
equal terms with the Spanish ones.
1 As regards the control on both interest rates and the
allocation of credit, the process of complete liberalisation was completed by the end of
eighties.
                    
1 Casado, Campoy and Chulia (1995) study the changes in the regulation of the Spanish financial system
after the Spanish entry in the EU.8



















































Open market Bank credits Bank deposits
Source: Bank of Spain
There is little doubt that the financial deregulation is responsible for the higher levels of
financial efficiency achieved by the Spanish financial system in the last decades, if by efficiency
we mean lower interest rates (figure 2). But apart from lower interest rates, financial
liberalisation has also produced a strong increase in the degree of concentration within the
banking sector, as banking history suggests (Dow, 1990, and Dow and Smithin, 1992).
Concentration within the banking sector has clearly risen in the last decades (table 1) and it is
likely that this trend will continue in the future since concentration within the Spanish banking
system is still relatively low compared to other developed countries. Hence, the 5 larger
banking institutions in Spain in 1995 had a market share of 48%, far below the level achieved
in most developed countries: Sweden (86%), Holland (81%), Canada (78%), Finland (74%),
Australia (67%), United Kingdom (57%), Belgium (59%), Noruega (58%), France (47%),
Swiss (50%), Italy (29%), Japan (27%), Germany (17%) and USA (13%).
2
                    
2 See Cebrian Carrasco (1997).9
TABLE 1: Concentration in Spanish banking, 1987-1996
BANKS SAVINGS BANKS
ATM NEE ATM NEE
HERFINDHAL-HIRSCHMAN
1987 0,04620 21 0,04726 21
1996 0,07413 13 0,07131 14
HALL-TIDEMAN
1987 0,02844 35 0,0309 32




Source: González Alcón (1998)
Financial deregulation has also fuelled mergers within the banking sector, and
especially among savings banks during 1990 and 1991 (figure 3). Mergers have been
important among those large Spanish banks which aim to play an active role in the European
banking market. However, mergers among savings banks have had a very different purpose
since they have been aimed to reinforce their competitive position within their local/regional
markets; that’s why mergers among savings banks have only involved institutions operating
within the same market (region).











































































































Source: Ontiveros and Valero (1997)
The increase in the number of banks in the nineties (figure 4) reflects the entry of both
“small specialised” banks and foreign-EU banks, most of them have focussed their business on
certain markets (personal and merchant banking, etc.). In contrast to the banks, the number of
savings banks has gone down as a consequence of mergers within the sector. However,
savings banks have also been increasing their average number of branches whereas banks10
seem to have stabilised. This different pattern evidences the nation-wide expansion of the two
major Spanish savings banks.


















































































































































































































Source: Bank of Spain
Financial deregulation in Spain seems to have reinforced the relevance of some
local/regional financial intermediaries.
3 Actually, the fact that only a very few saving banks (the
two larger ones) have extended their branches all over the country, and that mergers in this
sector have been restricted to the local/regional boundaries, has reinforced the regional
dimension of the savings banks. However, this shouldn’t be seen as a negative outcome per
se, since there is some evidence which also suggest that bank credit in Spain is better
distributed among regions (lower concentration) thanks to the existence of these local/regional
intermediaries (mostly, savings banks which only operate regionally).
4
The Spanish banking system may be characterised by the emergence of a “three-tier-
system”. In the first tier were institutions operating nation-wide (all large banks and only a very
few savings banks). The second level would be made up by some saving banks which operate
in more than one region. The third tier would include both those small new specialised banks
which operate in certain markets (personal banking, merchant banks, etc.) and the savings
banks which only operate within one region. The emergence of such a banking structure may
contradict the theoretical argument that financial liberalisation always leads to a higher degree
of market integration. Actually, the Spanish experience shows that financial liberalisation has
effectively removed the “institutional segmentation” existing within the banking sector in the
sixties and seventies; but it has also reinforced what is called “market segmentation”.
Furthermore, higher financial competition has led to an increased concentration within the
Spanish banking system, while there are important regional differences in terms financial
concentration (figure 5).
                    
3 See Garcia Roa (1999), Garcia Sanz  (1998) and Fuentelsaz and Gomez (1998).
4 Garcia and Cuesta (1999).11
FIGURE 5: Banking concentration: market share (%) of 5 larger institution




















Source: Cebrian Carrasco (1997)
It is impossible to know whether this segmentation might lead to the existence of
interregional differences in terms of interest rates because there is no statistical information in
this regard. However, it wouldn’t be too risky to say that this could be the case since there
seem to exist some differences among banks and savings banks in terms of financial margins
and interest rates (figure 6). However, it must be noted that these are only the consequences
of what it is called “institutional segmentation”, and that even without existing institutional
segmentation there could be “market segmentation” when nation-wide institutions applied
different credit policies between regions. Unfortunately, the official statistics do not allow us to
investigate this possibility further.12








































































































Source: Bank of Spain
So far we have tried to offer some descriptive evidence to show that financial
liberalisation has notably affected the structure of the Spanish banking system. But the main
purpose of this paper is to explore the potential effects that financial deregulation might have
produced for regional credit creation and, particularly, whether higher banking concentration
might have exacerbated the credit availability problems of peripheral regions in Spain.
According to the official view (sustained by the European Commission of the EU),
financial liberalisation should lead, among other things, to a better functioning of the credit
markets in peripheral regions. This argument seems to be supported by the Spanish experience
(figure 7), since the calculated Gini index value for the regional concentration of bank credit in
Spain has been going down at the same time that the financial system was being almost totally
deregulated.13





































































Source: Bank of Spain and BBV
However, it is not clear at all whether this secular trend towards a lower concentration
in the regional distribution of banking credit in Spain is due exclusively to the deregulation of
the financial sector. Actually, it might be that the improvement (and worsening) in credit
concentration were just explained by business cycles movements which, in turn, might have
affected both banks’ and borrowers’ liquidity preference in certain regions. Actually, the
evolution of credit concentration in Spain seems to follow a pattern which matches with
economic ups and downs since 1983. From 1983-1985 (recession) it increases and, starting
in 1985 it turns into a sharp decreasing trend of credit concentration which matches with the
expansionary period (from 1985 up to 1989). Finally this decreasing pattern ends in year
1990. From that year on the regional credit concentration seems to stabilise, coinciding with
the last economic recession (1990-1993). However, it must be noted that from 1994 there is
an increase in concentration despite economic expansion.
Contrary to what the European Commission of the EU sustains, our explanation for
the reduction in credit concentration lies in the changes operated by financial agents’ behaviour
according to the different phases of the business cycle. Our argument is that banking
competition and economic optimism may increase both supply and demand for credit in
remoter markets during economic expansions because of the existence of a lower liquidity
preference in that phase of the cycle. The lower concentration in credit during expansions
could be explained by both the strong banking competition (which may lead nation-wide
financial institutions to look for new investment opportunities in peripheral markets) and the
relatively lower liquidity preference which characterises economic upturns. Therefore, higher
rates of growth of credit in peripheral market wouldn’t be simply explained by the removal of
the monopoly power that local banks might have had before they were open to competition. If
this were the case then credit expansion was much stronger in peripheral regions during
expansions, whereas the contrary would apply for the downturns, the final result being a more
unstable pattern in credit creation in peripheral regions than in the developed ones. This
argument seems to apply to the recent Spanish experience. Hence, Rodriguez-Fuentes (1998)14
has found that there existed a negative relationship at the regional level between the Gross
Domestic Product per capita and the rate of growth of credit among the 17 Spanish regions
during the expansion of 1985-1990, whereas for the recession of the nineties (1991-1993)
this relationship turned out to be positive. Cuesta and Garcia (1998) have also offered some
evidence in the same line of reasoning. In fact, they have found that the dispersion of bank
credit among Spanish regions has gone down from 1986, although they also pointed out that
this decreasing pattern is strongly correlated to the soundness of the business cycle (the
greatest drop is achieved during the expansion 1986-1990).
If the former argument were valid, ie that the improvement in regional credit availability
were mostly due to changes in the regional pattern of liquidity preferences over the business
cycles, then it would be necessary to investigate further the underlying forces of such changes
and its potential regional implications. However, it is a difficult task to address this question
from an empirical point of view because of the lack of statistical information in this regard.
However, there are some general tendencies that can provide illumination.
Over the last years we have been experiencing a notable reduction in interest rates in
Spain. Lower interest rates have expanded the demand for credit, but have also driven
household savings away from bank deposits (mainly to Investment Funds). Investment Funds
5
have therefore achieved an important role within the financial preferences of households, but
also within the whole Spanish economy (table 2).
TABLE 2: Relevance of Investment funds in Spain (%)
GDP M4 Deposits Public
Debt (a)
1991 7,3 7,1 10,7 17,9
1992 11,2 10,9 16,7 27,9
1993 17,6 16,4 24,9 33,1
1994 18,0 16,6 25,5 34,1
1995 18,1 16,4 25,8 33,7
1996 25,3 24,3 39,6 45,4
1997 34,9 33,0 56,7 51,3
(a) Public Debt included in the Investment Funds
Source: Marcos Bermejo (1998)
Although bank credit has increased, it is also true that most of this increase have been
driven into “non productive” activities, according to the own classification used by the Central
Bank. In fact, figure 8 shows a sharp increase in the share of households in total credit,
whereas the share corresponding to productive credit has been going down since 1983. The
increasing role of non productive credit, which includes “home buying” funding, has very much
to do with the fact that this is not only a highly profitable market for institutions, but also a
more secure one. That is one of the ways through  which financial regulation may have been
affecting banks’ investment decisions, since in order to fulfil the capital adequacy ratios they
                    
5 An Investment Fund is a financial asset in which the funds provided by private investors are customised
by a Fund who acts in trust for the investors.15
might have driven financial resources not only to the home buying market, but also to the
public debt market since investment funds mostly invest their resources in these assets. There
is no doubt that most changes in Spanish financial regulation have been reinforced by the
financial harmonisation in Europe.



























































































Source: Bank of Spain
The increasing allocation of financial funds towards “Investment Funds” and “non
productive” credit might  have  rationed business investment because firms have increased their
self-financing thanks to the current economic expansion. However, it is difficult to say what
could happen when the situation reverts, ie when the current expansion comes (sooner or
later) to its end. In that case it might well happen that certain types of borrowers (mostly small
business) may be rationed in credit markets since they depend more heavily on banking credit
to finance their investments. But according to our analysis it is also likely that some banks
(nation-wide) may decide to slow down their investment in certain (peripheral) markets due to
the general rise in liquidity preference in those regions. Then, there could also be an “outflow
of funds” that in other conditions (lower liquidity preference) would remain within the region.
The final result would be a reduction in the availability of credit in some regional markets, and
what is really important to note is that this credit-crunch might not now be compensated by the
credit supplied by the “inefficient” local-regional intermediaries since they might have been
removed from the market “thanks” to the increased competition and higher efficiency
introduced by financial liberalisation If this were so, then it wouldn’t be unlikely that the
increasing concentration in the banking system in Spain may exacerbate, as we suggested
before, the credit availability problems of peripheral regions in the near future, and particularly
during times of economic uncertainty. But this could also be the case for Europe as a whole,
since the European Monetary Union is producing a strong restructuring of the European
financial system as well.
IV CONCLUSIONS16
We started with two distinctive views about the likely outcome of financial integration in
Europe. One was that increased competition would bring down borrowing costs and improve
availability. The other was that this increased competition would be reversed in a process of
concentration in the banking sector, with the consequence of credit availability problems for
peripheral regions.
On the face of it, the evidence on the effect of financial integration in Spain appears to
provide more support for the former view. We have seen that interest rates and financial
margins have clearly been reduced. Further the regional distribution of credit has also
improved, in the sense that it is now less concentrated from a regional point of view.
But we have noted other trends within the Spanish financial sector which leave open
the possibility that the sector is still in a transitional stage, such that the outcome in a few years
could be very different. The following conclusions suggest particular areas for study in order to
understand the effect of financial liberalisation on the structure of banking in Spain, and the
implications for the financing of business of different sizes and in different regions.
First, there is already evidence that financial liberalisation has led to an increased
concentration within the banking sector;  this is likely to continue in the future since the current
level of concentration  is still low (compared to most developed economies).
Second, although deregulation has tended to reduce regional segmentation in financial
markets and so achieve lower levels of interest rates and higher credit availability in those
segmented markets, the fact is that the Spanish banking system is still characterised by the
existence of a certain degree of segmentation. All large banks and two savings banks operate
nation-wide, but there are also some intermediaries whose natural markets are still local. Most
savings banks only operate within their regions, or at best in some nearby regions; also there
are many banks, for example merchant banks, which have focused on specific markets.
Third, another result of financial liberalisation has been the emergence of new
investment opportunities for households and banks (primarily in the form of investment funds).
These financial opportunities now compete (in terms of profitability and interest rates) with the
business demand for credit (especially small sized business, since large ones can now benefit
from opportunities “outside”). The Spanish experience shows that both households and banks
have diverted funds towards these emerging markets. (Spanish banks controls around 70% of
Investment Funds) The increasing allocation of funds towards these financial assets, together
with the increasing credit channelled towards non-productive activities (primarily home
buying), does not appear to have affected business financing in Spain yet. However, this might
not be the case for small business once future poorer economic performances reduce their
capacity for self-financing. Small businesses are the market segment which may be affected
most by credit rationing in the future, together with, more generally,  markets/regions which are
considered by large banks as peripheral (more unstable, risky, etc.). The analysis here
suggests that much of the “improvement” in the regional concentration of credit can be
explained as much by changes in liquidity preference during the course of business cycles, as
by the increased competition introduced with the financial reforms.17
It is early days yet in the process of financial integration in Europe. What we have
found for Spain is an outcome which characterises the early stages of a process of opening up
financial markets to competition. The more telling evidence will emerge over the next decade,
during which it will become more clear whether the beneficial effects of enhanced competition
will persist, or be eroded by a process of concentration in banking.
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